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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Appellee Darnell Alton was one of four individuals 
charged in an indictment alleging various drug offenses.  Count 
One charged Alton with conspiracy to possess and distribute 
cocaine and cocaine base ("crack cocaine"), in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846; Count Two charged Alton with possession with intent 
to distribute in excess of five grams of cocaine base, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count Three charged Alton 
with possession with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams 
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).    
 Between 1990 and 1992, Alton was a heavy crack cocaine 
trafficker in the Pittsburgh area.  He employed a number of 
people who cooked cocaine powder into crack, stored it, and 
distributed it on the street.  On July 23, 1991, following a tip 
from a confidential informant that Alton was in possession of a 
large quantity of cocaine, which he was selling from his house, 
police executed search warrants for Alton's person, residence, 
and car. Crack cocaine was found on Alton's person and cocaine 
powder and cash was found at Alton's residence.  Three members of 
Alton's operation testified at trial about Alton's drug 
transactions. 
 Alton was found guilty at trial on Counts One and Two 
but was acquitted on Count Three.  At sentencing, the district 
court departed downward from the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines ("Guidelines") range for cocaine base offenses and 
imposed a ten-year term of imprisonment and a five-year term of 
supervised release.  The Government filed this appeal to 
challenge the district court's failure to follow the provisions 
of the Guidelines as they apply to offenses involving cocaine 
base.  Because we find that the district court erred in departing 
downwards from the applicable guideline range, we will vacate the 
sentence and remand for resentencing.0 
II. 
A. 
 At issue in this case are the provisions of the 
Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1) that impose more severe 
sentences on those prosecuted for distribution or possession with 
intent to distribute crack cocaine0 than on those prosecuted for 
similar crimes involving cocaine powder.0  The disparity in the 
                                                           
0
 On cross-appeal, Alton alleges that the Government 
introduced evidence seized pursuant to a defective search 
warrant, thereby violating his rights as guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We have reviewed 
this claim and find it to be without merit. 
0
 The Guidelines define cocaine base as "crack" -- "the 
street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by 
processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and 
usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form."  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, 
Drug Quantity Table, footnote.  We use the terms "cocaine base" 
and "crack cocaine" interchangeably in this opinion to 
distinguish this form of cocaine from cocaine powder. 
0
 This sentencing scheme applies to defendants convicted 
of the offenses enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), including 
distribution or possession with intent to distribute controlled 
substances, and those convicted of attempting or conspiring to 
treatment of offenses involving the two substances originated in 
congressional action.    
 Pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress 
established basic sentencing levels for crack cocaine offenses. 
Congress amended 21 U.S.C. § 841 to provide for a 100:1 ratio in 
the quantities of cocaine powder and crack cocaine that trigger 
mandatory minimum penalties.  Amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) 
establishes a mandatory ten-year term of imprisonment for 
offenses involving 5 kilograms of cocaine or 50 grams of cocaine 
base.  And 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) provides for a mandatory 
five-year term of imprisonment for offenses involving 500 grams 
of cocaine or 5 grams of cocaine base.   
 Based on those statutory provisions, the Drug Quantity 
Table of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 treats any quantity of cocaine base as 
the equivalent of 100 times the same quantity of cocaine powder. 
Moreover, the Drug Equivalency Tables, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, pursuant 
to which the penalty for an offense involving one controlled 
substance is tied to or converted to the weight of an unrelated 
controlled substance for sentencing purposes, equate one gram of 
cocaine base to 20 kilograms of marijuana but one gram of cocaine 
to 200 grams of marijuana. 
B. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
commit those offenses, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846.  See United 
States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 94 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining 
the sentencing scheme), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1661 (1993), 
cert. denied sub nom. Pettus v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1662 
(1993).  
 Although Alton was found guilty of crack cocaine 
offenses, the district court departed downward from the sentence 
range that the Guidelines prescribe for such offenses.  The court 
attributed 422.68 grams of crack cocaine and 235.5 grams of 
cocaine powder to Alton.  Pursuant to the Drug Equivalency Table, 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the court converted the 422.68 grams of crack 
cocaine to 8453.6 kilograms of marijuana and the 235.5 grams of 
cocaine powder to 47.1 kilograms of marijuana, arriving at a 
total of 8500.7 kilograms of marijuana, which corresponds to a 
base offense level of 34.  The court added 4 levels to the base 
offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), based on Alton's 
role in the offense, but granted a 3 point reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.   
 Thus, the court fixed the total offense level at 35, 
which provides for a sentence range of 168-210 months.  The court 
granted a downward departure from that range based on 18 U.S.C. 
§3553(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0,0 concluding that the Sentencing 
Commission did not adequately consider a mitigating factor -- the 
disparate impact that its policies would have on African-American 
males -- when it developed guideline ranges for crack cocaine.0   
                                                           
0
 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 states: 
 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) the sentencing court may 
impose a sentence outside the range established by the 
applicable guideline, if the court finds "that there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described."  
0
 The court adopted the reasoning of a district court 
case that since has been vacated in relevant part.  See United 
 In justifying the departure, the court further relied 
on indications that Congress has reconsidered the rationality of 
the 1 to 100 ratio.  Moreover, the court cited the 1993 annual 
report of the United States Sentencing Commission, which 
indicates that for the period from October 1, 1992, through 
September 30, 1993, "95.1 percent of the offenders incarcerated 
and subjected to the 1 to 100 ratio between crack and powdered 
cocaine [were] either black or Hispanics."  Appendix at 846, 872-
73.   
 The court additionally discussed the Drug Equivalency 
Tables, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  The court concluded that the 
conversion of one gram of cocaine base to 20 kilograms of 
marijuana, pursuant to those tables, is arbitrary and capricious.  
Citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) as authority, the 
court elected to ignore what it termed the "improper agency 
action" establishing the equivalency and to apply the mandatory 
minimum sentence established by Congress for similar offenses 
involving cocaine powder.   
III. 
A. 
 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii) are the 
statutory provisions that establish a mandatory minimum ten year 
penalty for offenses involving cocaine powder and crack cocaine. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
States v. Majied, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15156 (D. Neb. July 29, 
1993), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. United States 
v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 
(1994). 
The statute provides a 100:1 ratio between the amounts of crack 
cocaine and of cocaine powder which are required to activate the 
minimum mandatory penalty.  Both parties acknowledge that the 
statute is constitutional on its face.  However, the Government 
challenges the district court's conclusion that the guideline 
treatment of crack cocaine offenses is arbitrary and capricious. 
Moreover, the Government challenges the district court's downward 
departure from the Guidelines based on the disproportionate 
impact of the severe penalties for crack cocaine offenses on 
African-Americans. 
B. 
 The district court held that the Sentencing Commission 
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by providing for the 
conversion of one gram of cocaine base to 20 kilograms of 
marijuana for sentencing purposes, pursuant to the Drug 
Equivalency Tables in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  The court concluded that 
the Sentencing Commission violated the informal rulemaking 
procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, 
and that the guideline provisions under which Alton was sentenced 
are therefore void.0 
                                                           
0The parties did not raise, this Circuit has not decided, and we 
accordingly do not address, the issue of whether or not the 
Sentencing Commission, as an entity within the judicial branch, 
is an agency which is subject to the provisions of the APA.  See 
Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Com'n, 17 F.3d 1446, 
1450 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (Commission not subject to the provisions of 
the APA except as specifically enumerated). However, Congress did 
specifically provide in 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) that promulgation of 
the Guidelines by the Sentencing Commission would be subject to 
the rulemaking provisions of § 553 of the APA.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 394 (1989) ("In contrast to a 
court, [the Commission's] rule-making is subject to the notice 
 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. at 43, the Supreme 
Court held that an agency adopting a rule pursuant to informal 
rulemaking procedures "must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
`rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.'"  The Commission provides such an explanation for the 
challenged Guideline provisions in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment 10, 
which states that the Commission "used the sentences provided in, 
and equivalences derived from, the statute (21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)) as the primary basis for the Guideline sentences."   
 As the district court held, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) does 
not equate crack cocaine to another controlled substance or 
authorize the use of an equivalency table pursuant to which the 
penalty for an offense involving one controlled substance is tied 
to or converted to the weight of an unrelated controlled 
substance. Nonetheless, the statute does establish the 100:1 
ratio of cocaine powder to crack cocaine.  The same ratio is 
reflected in the Drug Equivalency Tables, pursuant to which 1 
gram of cocaine is equivalent to 200 grams of marijuana and 1 
gram of crack cocaine is equivalent to 20 kilograms of marijuana.  
The Commission established drug equivalences as "a means for 
combining differing controlled substances to obtain a single 
offense level."  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment 10.  Clearly the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and comment requirements of the [APA].") The parties to this 
appeal have agreed that the standard to be applied is "arbitrary 
and capricious."  
Commission looked to the statute as a guide in formulating the 
equivalences.  The statute in turn was based on Congress's 
consideration of available data on the two forms of cocaine. 
 We have upheld the constitutionality of both the 
federal drug statutes (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1) & 846) and the 
guideline provisions (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1) that treat crack cocaine 
offenses more severely than offenses involving an equal quantity 
of cocaine powder.  See United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d at 92 
(holding that distinctions between crack cocaine and cocaine 
powder for sentencing purposes do not constitute an equal 
protection violation and that the 100:1 ratio does not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 
317 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding guideline provisions imposing higher 
offense levels for offenses involving crack cocaine not to be 
unconstitutionally vague).     
 In United States v. Frazier, we explicitly rejected an 
equal protection challenge to the relevant statutory and 
guideline procedures.  We first observed that the statutes and 
guidelines do not on their face classify defendants by race.  
Next, we determined that the provisions do not employ a facially 
"non-racial characteristic that strongly correlates with race for 
cultural or socioeconomic reasons as a sham disguising invidious 
racial classification."  Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95 (citing Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).  We concluded that there was 
"no evidence whatsoever that suggests that the distinction drawn 
between cocaine base and cocaine was motivated by any racial 
animus or discriminatory intent on the part of either Congress or 
the Sentencing Commission."  Id.  We held that absent such an 
explicit or inferable discriminatory purpose, the statutory 
distinction between cocaine base and cocaine is subject to 
rational basis review, which it withstands.0  Id.      
 In rejecting constitutional challenges to the 
distinction between cocaine base and cocaine powder in the 
federal sentencing scheme, courts have consistently found that 
Congress had a rational basis for treating offenses involving the 
two substances differently.  In Jones, 979 F.2d at 320, we 
emphasized the chemical differences between crack cocaine and 
cocaine powder, concluding that "the Sentencing Guidelines have a 
reasonable basis to differentiate between cocaine base and 
cocaine salt."  Moreover, other courts have emphasized the 
potency of crack cocaine, "the ease with which drug dealers can 
carry and conceal it, the highly addictive nature of the drug, 
and the violence which often accompanies trade in it."  United 
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 The Jones and Frazier decisions appear to be in accord 
with the decisions of other federal courts of appeals.  These 
federal courts have uniformly upheld the statutory and guideline 
penalties for crack cocaine offenses against due process, equal 
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment claims.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1994) (equal 
protection challenge), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 767 (1995); 
United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37 (9th Cir.) (equal protection 
challenge), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 261 (1994); United States v. 
Fisher, 22 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 1994) (Eighth Amendment challenge), 
cert. denied sub nom. Dunkins v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 529 
(1994), ; United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(due process challenge), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194 (1994); 
United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992) (due 
process and equal protection challenge), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
2448 (1993); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(vagueness and Eighth Amendment challenge). 
States v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1819 (1993).0 
 We conclude, therefore, that no "improper" agency 
action was involved in the Sentencing Commission's establishment 
of the Equivalency Tables, at least insofar as we are involved 
here with the 100:1 ratio between crack cocaine and cocaine 
powder.  
C. 
 We next address the Government's contention that the 
district court erred in concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 authorize a downward departure from the 
applicable guideline range on the grounds that the Sentencing 
Commission did not adequately consider the disparate impact that 
its policies would have on African-American males when it 
developed guideline ranges for crack cocaine offenses.  
 As set forth above, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 adopts the mandate 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), stating that a sentencing court may 
impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable 
guideline upon finding the existence of "an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
                                                           
0
 See also United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that the penalty scheme "evinces a rational 
purpose and does not violate the Due Process clause"); United 
States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
the 100:1 ratio is rationally related to the congressional 
objective of protecting public welfare). 
 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 
different from that described."  U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. 
 In Frazier, we held that even assuming the appellants' 
claim that "a very high percentage of defendants convicted for 
cocaine base offenses are black, while defendants convicted for 
cocaine offenses are more likely to be white," such racial 
disparities are insufficient to establish that U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 
violates the equal protection clause.  We held that "[e]ven 
conscious awareness on the part of the legislature that the law 
will have a racially disparate impact does not invalidate an 
otherwise valid law," provided that such awareness does not play 
a causal role in the statute's passage.  Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95.   
 Although the issue here is not whether the relevant 
guideline provisions are invalid on the grounds of disparate 
impact but only whether a downward departure is warranted, the 
reasoning of Frazier is instructive.  Moreover, every appellate 
court that has considered the matter has held that the impact of 
the guideline treatment of crack cocaine is not a proper ground 
for downward departures from the applicable guideline range.  
These courts have rejected defendants' arguments that the 
continued enforcement, rather than the enactment, of the 
challenged sentencing provisions is unconstitutional.0 
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 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994); United States v. 
Bynum, 3 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1105 
(1994); United States v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d at 971; United 
States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1993).   
 In United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d at 774-75, the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the Sentencing 
Commission's alleged failure to consider the disparate impact on 
African-Americans of the 100:1 powder-to-crack ratio constitutes 
a ground for a downward departure.  The court reasoned that a 
showing that the Commission failed to take a factor into account 
cannot suffice to justify a downward departure.  Indeed, the 
court explained, "[f]rom the countless factors that constitute 
the human experience, the Commission necessarily considered only 
a few.  Any defendant can identify something about himself that 
the guidelines do not address."  Id. at 774.  Therefore, the 
court emphasized, the factor alleged not to have been considered 
must also be a factor for which a sentence outside the guidelines 
"should result."  Id. 
 Observing that the proposed mitigating circumstance in 
Bynum rested on membership in a class rather than on a factor 
personal to the defendant, the court held that the guidelines' 
failure to address the impact of a provision on a class should 
result in a class-wide downward departure "only when failure to 
provide it would deprive the class of equal protection."  Id. at 
775.  Thus, the court rejected the "extraordinary relief" that 
the defendant requested on the grounds that the 100:1 powder-to-
crack ratio was not enacted pursuant to a discriminatory purpose 
and thus did not violate the constitutional principle of equal 
protection. Id.; see also Maxwell, 25 F.3d at 1401 (adopting the 
Fourth Circuit's reasoning and stating that allowing such a 
class-wide departure would "impede Congress's policy decision to 
treat cocaine base more harshly than powder cocaine"). 
 Alton has not established facts or circumstances 
peculiar to himself or his offense that justify a downward 
departure.  He justifies departure from the guidelines solely on 
the overall impact of the guidelines, a factor present in all 
crack cocaine cases.  Such a departure cannot be reconciled with 
the language of the guidelines.  
 Indeed the reasoning of Bynum and other cases in which 
courts have refused to affirm downward departures based on the 
disparate impact of the crack cocaine sentencing scheme rests 
squarely on the language of the guidelines.  The Commentary to 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 states that "[i]n the absence of a 
characteristic or circumstance that distinguishes a case as 
sufficiently atypical to warrant a sentence different from that 
called for under the guidelines, a sentence outside the guideline 
range is not authorized."  The Commission likewise addresses the 
subject of departures in the Introduction to Chapter One of the 
Guidelines, stating: 
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat 
each guideline as carving out a "heartland," a set of 
typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline 
describes.  When a court finds an atypical case, one to 
which a particular guideline linguistically applies but 
where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the 
court may consider whether a departure is warranted. 
 
U.S.S.G. Manual, Ch.1, Part A4(b).  The Commission noted its 
expectation "that despite the courts' legal freedom to depart 
from the guidelines, they will not do so very often."  Id. 
IV.  
 We limit our decision to holding that the disparate 
impact of the severe penalties for crack cocaine offenses on 
African-Americans is not a valid ground for departure from the 
guideline ranges for crack cocaine offenses.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing within the 
applicable guideline ranges.  We defer to Congress and the 
Sentencing Commission to address the related policy issues and to 
consider the wisdom of retaining the present sentencing scheme. 
